A certifying algorithm for a decision problem is an algorithm that provides a certificate with each answer that it produces. The certificate is a piece of evidence that proves that the answer has not been compromised by a bug in the implementation. We give linear-time certifying algorithms for recognition of interval graphs and permutation graphs. Previous algorithms fail to provide supporting evidence when they claim that the input graph is not a member of the class. We show that our certificates of non-membership can be authenticated in O(IV[) time.
Introduction
A recognition algorithm is an algorithm that decides whether some given input (graph, geometrical object, picture, etc.) has a certain property. A certifying algorithm for a decision problem is an algorithm that provides a certificate with each answer that it produces. The certificate is a piece of evidence that proves that the answer has not been compromised by a bug in the implementation.
We give linear-time certifying algorithms for recognition of interval graphs and permutation graphs. Previous algorithms fail to provide supporting evidence of non-membership. We show that our certificates of non-membership in can be authenticated in O(n) time, where n is the number of vertices. Such an algorithm accepts the input if it has the property or rejects it if it does not.
A familiar example of a certifying recognition algorithm is a recognition algorithm for bipartite graphs that computes a 2-coloring for bipartite input graphs and an odd cycle for non-bipartite input graphs. A more complex example is the linear-time planarity test which is part of the LEDA system [13, Section 8.7] . It computes a planar embedding for planar input graphs and a -------~'krr~sch~lita.sciences.univ-metz.fr, Universit6 Certifying versions of recognition algorithms are highly desirable in practice; see [17] and [13, section 2.14] for general discussions on result checking. Consider a planarity testing algorithm that produces a planar embedding if the graph is planar, and simply declares it non-planar otherwise. Though the algorithm may have been proven correct, the implementation may contain bugs. When the algorithm declares a graph nonplanar, there is no way to check whether it did so because of a bug.
Given the reluctance of practitioners to assume on faith that a program is bug-free, it is surprising that the theory community has often ignored the question of requiring an algorithm to certify its output, even in cases when the existence of adequate certificates is wellknown.
In this paper, we examine two such problems, namely, the problems of recognizing whether a graph is an interval graph and recognizing whether a graph is a permutation graph.
An interval graph is the intersection graph of intervals on a line. That is, each vertex corresponds to an associated interval, and two vertices are adjacent iff the corresponding intervals intersect. The intervals constitute an interval model of the graph. Interval graphs have applications in molecular biology and scheduling.
A permutation graph is the graph of inversions in a permutation. That is, each vertex corresponds to an element of the ground set of a permutation, and two vertices are adjacent iff the permutation reverses the relative order of the two corresponding elements. If a graph is a permutation graph, we may show this by giving a permutation model, which consists of two linear orderings (vl, v2, ..., vn) and (v~o), v~(2), ..., v~(n)) of the vertices, such that two vertices vi and vj are adjacent iff vi is before vj in exactly one of the orderings.
Several linear-time recognition algorithms for interval graphs are known [1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12] . When a graph is an interval graph, these algorithms produce a certificate in the form of an interval model. However, the existence of certificates of rejection in the form of a forbidden substructure characterization is also wellknown. Despite this, these algorithms ignore the issue of producing one when they reject a graph.
The only previous linear-time algorithm for permutation graphs is given in [12] . This algorithm produces a permutation model if the graph is a member of the class, and presents its failure to produce such a model as the only evidence that a graph is not a member of the class. A graph G is a permutation graph iff G and its complement G are comparability graphs. Gallai gave a forbidden substructure characterization of comparability graphs [5] . We do not know how to obtain this certificate in linear time for non-comparability graphs. However, we show that when G is not a permutation graph, we may produce this certificate for G or for G in linear time. This gives a certifying algorithm for permutation graphs. It fails to give a linear-time certifying algorithm for comparability graphs only because we cannot control whether the algorithm will find the certificate in G or in G, even when they both fail to be comparability graphs. (No linear-time recognition algorithm is known for comparability graphs.)
Preliminaries
We consider only finite, undirected and simple graphs. Let G = (V, E) be a graph. We let n denote the number of vertices and m denote the number of edges. (u, vl,v2,...,vk) , and Pw denotes the path (vl, v2, ..., vk, w).
What constitutes a certificate
Since software that generates a certificate could have a bug, a proposed certificate must be authenticated by verifying that it does, in fact, prove the result. For instance, if an odd cycle in a graph is presented as a certificate that the graph is not bipartite, authentication consists of verifying that it is a cycle, it has odd length, and that the claimed edges occur in the graph. The cycle can be given as a sequence of pointers to its edges in the input data structure, and takes O(n) time for the user to authenticate, which is better than the O(n + m) bound to check whether a graph is bipartite.
A good certificate is one whose authentication algorithm is conceptually simpler than algorithms for the original problem, has a better time bound, or both. If the authentication step is simple and efficient enough, it may be possible to perform the check by visual inspection.
When the certificate is checked automatically, reliability of the implementation of the authentication algorithm is an obvious goal. Otherwise, consider the following scenario: the implementations of the certifying algorithm and of the authentication algorithm are both faulty. The certifying algorithm produces both an erroneous answer to the decision problem and an erroneous certificate, while the faulty authentication algorithm then claims that the certificate proves the given answer. The user is led to believe an erroneous conclusion.
A reliable implementation of an authentication algorithm is easier to achieve if it is simple. Though simplicity of the verification algorithm is likely to be the primary motivation in practice, simplicity is admittedly a subjective criterion. Let us therefore dub a certificate strong if its verification algorithm has a better time bound than known algorithms for the original problem, and weak if it has other advantages that must be judged by subjective criteria. A strong certificate simplifies the problem in a way that can be characterized objectively.
Fortunately, strong certificates appear to be common. However, if the rejection certificate is strong, the acceptance certificate is usually weak, and if the acceptance certificate is strong, the rejection certificate is usually weak. For instance, recognizing bipartite graphs has a strong rejection certificate (an odd cycle) and a weak acceptance certificate (a 2-coloring). Recognizing connected graphs has a strong acceptance certificate (a spanning tree) and a weak rejection certificate (a cut {V', V -V'} that has no edges across it). Directed acyclic graphs have a weak acceptance certificate (a topological sort) and a strong rejection certificate (a directed cycle).
Since the rejection certificates that our algorithms give can be verified in O(n) time, they are strong.
The acceptance certificates, which are also given by the previous algorithms, are weak.
A certifying algorithm for interval graphs
A chord in a simple cycle is an edge that is not an edge of the cycle, but whose endpoints are both vertices in the cycle. A chordless cycle is a simple cycle of length at least .four that has no chord. An undirected graph is chordal if it has no chordless cycle.
Three independent vertices x, y, z of a graph G are an asteroidal triple (AT) of G if, between each pair of these vertices, there is a path that contains no neighbors of the third. A graph is said to be AT-free if it has no asteroidal triple. For more information on these and other graph classes we refer the reader to [2, 6] . We will rely on the following well-known theorem.
THEOREM 4.1. (LEKKERKERKER AND BOLAND [11]) A graph is an interval graph if and only if it chordal and AT-free.
A graph is chordal iff it has a perfect elimination ordering, whirl1 is an ordering (vl,v2,. ..,Vn) of the vertices such that for each vi, N(vi)N{vi+l, vi+2, ..., Vn} is a clique [4] . A perfect elimination ordering of a chordal graph can be found in linear time by the LexBFS algorithm [15, 6] .
A modification of this algorithm points out a chordless cycle of length at least four as a certificate of non-membership [16] . Hence, this is a linear-time certifying recognition algorithm for chordal graphs.
The certificates
When the graph is an interval graph, we produce an interval model, just as the prior algorithms do. For the authentication step, it is easy to check whether this model corresponds to the input graph in time that is linear in the size of the input graph. The basic trick is to work left-to-right through the model generating edges implied by the model, rejecting the certificate immediately if the number of edges exceeds the number of edges in the graph. Otherwise, when finished, verify that the generated edges are the same as those in the graph, by radix sorting both lists to get them into the same order. Since authentication takes linear time, the interval model is a weak certificate.
When the graph is not an interval graph, Theorem 4.1 provides the basis of our certificate: we produce either a chordless cycle or an asteroidal triple. Despite initial appearances, these can be turned into strong certificates. For the asteroidal triple, we accomplish this by returning not only the triple, but for each pair in the triple, the sequence of edges of a simple path between them that avoids the neighborhood of the third. The sequence of edges may be given by pointers to the corresponding edge structures in the user-supplied data. Given the triple, it is easy to find these three paths in linear time. The authentication algorithm must verify that each proposed path is a path, that its edges occur in G, and that no neighbors of the third vertex occurs on it. If each path is given by pointers to edges in the input structure in the order in which they occur on the path, this is accomplished in O(n) time by marking the neighbors of each vertex in the triple. This is a strong certificate because O(n) is a better bound than O(n + m).
There appears to be no hope of verifying that a proposed chordless cycle C is, in fact, chordless in sublinear worst-case time. In view of this, it is surprising that C still serves as a strong certificate. The O(n) authentication algorithm first verifies that C is a cycle in G of size at least four. It then selects any four consecutive vertices (u, x, y, w) and verifies that x and y have no neighbors on C other than the ones that they are supposed to. That is, it verifies that x has no neighbors on C other than u and y, and y has no neighbors on C other than x and w. If these tests fail, the certificate is ruled faulty. Otherwise, if the certifying algorithm has a bug, C may still have undetected chords. However, in this case, any minimal cycle consisting of x, y, and other vertices of C must be a chordless cycle of size at least four. The user can be certain that such a cycle exists without actually finding it, hence that G is not an interval graph.
4.2 Generating the certificates For our certifying algorithm, we use the linear-time algorithm of Korte and Moehring [10] as a subroutine. Though this is not a certifying algorithm, it produces a certificate in the form of an interval representation in the case where the graph is an interval graph.
Suppose the input graph is not an interval graph. Using the algorithm of [16] , we return a chordless cycle if the graph is not chordal.
It remains to show how to produce a certificate in the case where the graph is chordal, but not an interval graph. Henceforth, we will assume that this case applies.
This algorithm of Korte and Moehring produces a perfect elimination ordering (vl, v2, ..., v,~), and incrementally decides whether the subgraph induced by the vertices {Vn, ..., vi} is an interval graph. Since we now assume that the graph is not an interval graph, it fails when considering a particular vertex vi-1. The subgraph induced by the vertices {Vn, ..., vi} is an interval graph and the subgraph induced by {vn, ..., vi, vi-1 } is not.
In the remainder of this section, we use G to denote the subgraph induced by {v~, ..., vi} and we let x = vi-1. The graph G+x is a chordal graph but not an interval graph and hence it must contain an AT by Theorem 4.1. The neighbors of x form a clique in G since (vl, v2,..., vn) is a perfect elimination ordering of the input graph.
The Korte-MShring algorithm provides an interval model of G. We may assume without loss of generality that all endpoints in the interval model of G are pairwise distinct, since, when they are not, they can be perturbed to make this true without altering the represented graph. Let us then number the endpoints in left-to- Success or failure of an authentication algorithm on the permutation model it produces provides the basis for deciding whether the graph is a permutation graph in that algorithm. The procedure is not a certifying algorithm, since the permutation model could also have been faulty due to a bug in the implementation.
5.1
The certificates A linear-time authentication algorithm for a proposed permutation model is given in [12] . The permutation model is therefore a weak certificate.
It remains to describe the rejection certificate. Let us consider an undirected graph to be a special case of a digraph, namely, the symmetric digraph where if (x, y) is a directed arc, then so is (y, x). The undirected edge xy is just the pair {(x,y), (y,x)}. Finding a transitive orientation of an undirected graph G amounts to deleting one arc from each symmetric pair so that the remaining arcs are transitive.
Let F be the relation on arcs, where (u, w)F(x, y) if u = x and w and y are nonadjacent or w = y and u and x are nonadjacent. When (u, w)F(x, y), any transitive orientation that contains one of the arcs must also contain the other.
Let G = (V, E) be an arbitrary undirected graph, and let AG be its directed arcs. Let FG be the graph (Ao, F) whose vertices are the arcs of G. A transposed path therefore serves as a certificate that a graph is not a comparability graph. It follows from Theorem 5.1 that a transposed path either in G or in G serves as a certificate that G is not a permutation graph.
Let us require that the user supply an adjacencylist representation where the edge lists are sorted by the identifier of the neighbors. The authentication algorithm for the transposed path consists of verifying that every pair of consecutive arcs in the transposed path is in the F relation. For each such pair, this requires verifying the presence/absence of three possible edges in G. The certificate gives pointers to the locations in the sorted adjacency lists where the presence or absence of an edge can be checked. The authentication algorithm therefore takes time proportional to the length of the transposed path, which we will show is O(n). This is therefore a strong certificate.
Finding a transitivity violation
The algorithm for recognizing permutation graphs given in [12] uses TO to find linear extensions of orientations D and D' of G and of G. Since it provides a certificate if G is a permutation graph, we will assume in the remainder of the paper that G is not. In this case, at least one of D and D' has a transitivity violation.
In this subsection, we describe how to find a transitivity violation in D or D' in time linear in the size of G, given G and linear extensions ~" and T of D and of D'. This constitutes proof that the implementation of TO failed to produce an orientation of G or of G that is transitive. However, it is not a certificate that G is not a permutation graph, since the failure could be due to a bug in the implementation of TO. In the next subsection, we show how to find a certificate, given the transitivity violation. 
Finding the rejection certificate, given a transitivity violation
In this subsection, we give a linear-time algorithm to find a transposed path in G, given a transitivity violation in the orientation assigned to it by TO. We show how to apply the algorithm to G in time linear in the size of G. Since we have shown how to find a transitivity violation in G or in G in linear time when G is not a permutation graph, this will complete the certifying algorithm.
A module of an undirected graph G = (V, E) is a set X of vertices such that for each vertex y E V-X, either every element of X is a neighbor of y or no member of X is a neighbor of y. V, the empty set, and the singleton subsets {{x}[x • V} are trivial modules. G is prime if it has only trivial modules.
The problem of verifying that G is a permutation graph reduces in linear time to the problem of verifying that a set of prime induced subgraphs are permutation graphs [12] . A transposed path in an induced subgraph or its complement is a transposed path in G or its complement. Therefore, when G is not a permutation graph, producing a transposed path in G or in G reduces in linear time to the same problem in the special case where G is prime. V -{v} is split into {e, f, g} and {a, c, w} with pivot on vertex v. Then {e, f, g} is split into {e, f} and {g} with pivot vertex w, {a, c, w} is split into {a} and {c, w} with pivot f, etc. The procedure halts when all sets have cardinality one. The tree depicts the Hasse diagram of the sets that appear at any point during the procedure. Our modification of the algorithm creates this Hasse diagram for use as a data structure, together with the pivot label at each internal node that gives the pivot that split the corresponding set, and a record of which child contains elements that are adjacent to the pivot. We show how to modify TO so that it creates a record that allows us to find a path of length O(n) in F between any two arcs that are included in its orientation of a prime graph G. If G is not a comparability graph, the algorithm produces an orientation with a transitivity violation {(a, b), (b, c)}. Since (a, b) and (b, c) are included in its orientation of G, the modified algorithm gives us a path P in FG of length O(n) from (a, b) to (b, c).
By the definitions of FG and of a transitivity violation, ((b, c), (b, a) ) is an edge of FG. Appending this edge to the path gives a transposed path from (a, b) to (b, a).
We may assume henceforth that G is prime and not a permutation graph. TO begins with a partition T' = {{v}, V-{v}} of the vertices Y of G, where v is an arbitrary element of the vertex set V. In a process called vertex partitioning, it iteratively refines the partition using the following step, until P is the partition of V into one-element subsets:
• Figure 1 illustrates the procedure. Because G is prime, it is always possible to partition V down to oneelement sets. A linear arrangement of the partition classes is maintained, so that when Y is split, Yn and Y~, they occupy consecutive places at the former position of Y, with Ya placed farther than Yn from the partition class that contains the pivot. This ensures that the final ordering will be a topological sort of a transitive orientation when G is a comparability graph. Example. In Figure 1 , w is the undefeated vertex. The parent of arc (c, w) is found by retrieving the pivot label e of the least common ancestor of {c} and {w}. This arc must be incident to e and whichever of c or w was on the neighbors' side of the split when e was used to split {c, w}. The parent of (c, w) is, therefore, (e, w). A spanning tree in F U does not have size that is linear in the size of G. To operate on G, we give Tx and T2 implicitly by computing a data structure that allows us to find the parent of an arc easily. This data structure consists of two Hasse diagrams, such as those of Figure 2 , one for each of two vertex partitions of TO.
For the first vertex partition, the Hasse diagram is a tree rooted at Y with children {v} and V -{v}, and one leaf for each subset of V of cardinality one. Note that the height of each Hasse diagram is at most n -1. The first Hasse diagram is used for finding the parent of any arc incident to the undefeated vertex w, while the second is used for finding the parent of any other arc.
As illustrated in Figure 2 , we may find the parent of any edge in either of the two vertex partitions. We can therefore find a path from any arc in T1 to the root of Tx, by Lemma 5.4. Any two arcs included in the orientation produced by the algorithm are in T1, so the disjoint portions of their paths to the root yield a path from one to the other. Proof. A linear-time algorithm is given in [12] for the vertex partitioning procedure. The procedure is easily modified to record the Hasse diagram for sets that appear in the partitions. The same vertex partition will do for orienting G or G; only the rule for ordering children to obtain a leaf order corresponding to a topological sort of the orientation differs. The first is to find the undefeated vertex w, and the second starts with partition {{w}, V -{w}} to find a topological sort of an orientation of G that must be transitive if G is a comparability graph. It orders the second tree so that its left-to-right leaf order is this topological sort. In this illustration, the graph is not a comparability graph, and the orientation results in a transitivity violation, {(a, v), (v, c)}. Using the Hasse diagrams for the two sorts, we may reconstruct how the algorithm arrived at this orientation of these two edges. Since (v, c) is not incident to w, we start with the second Hasse diagram. The least-common ancestor of (v, c) has pivot label g, so (g, c) is the parent of (v, c). The least-common ancestor of (g, c) is labeled with pivot w, so (w, c) is the parent of (g, c). Since (w, c) is incident to w, we switch to the first Hasse diagram. The least-common ancestor of (w, c) yields (w, e) as the parent, and the least common ancestor of (w, e) yeidls (w, v) as its parent. This arc is the root of a tree in the spanning forest of Fa that contains the arcs that are included in the orientation. In a similar way, we find that (w, v) is the parent of the other arc in the transitivity violation, To find the ancestors of an arc (a, b) in T1 that are given in one of the Hasse diagrams, mark the ancestors of a in the Hasse diagram. This takes O(n) time. Search upward from b until a marked node is encountered. This is the least-common ancestor of A1 of (a, b) in the Hasse diagram. Suppose by induction that the least-common ancestor Ak in the Hasse diagram has been found for some ancestor (x, y) of (a, b) in T1. Let z be the pivot label of this ancestor. Search upward from z until a marked node is of the Hasse diagram is encountered. This is the least-common ancestor Ak+l in the Hasse diagram of the parent of (x, y) in T1. Since this Ak+l is higher in the Hasse diagram than any other leastcommon ancestor found so far, the search upward from z uses a different set of edges of the Hasse diagram from those used by previous upward searches. The cost of this search can be charged to the edges traversed during the search. The cost of finding M1 ancestors in T1 is O(n), and the length of the path is O(n). The path in FG that we have described consists of at most four such paths: at most two from T, and at most two from Ta or Tb.
Thus, this path has length O(n).
Remark: It is not hard to show that the length of the returned path is at most 3n -6, which gives a bound of 3n-5 on the number of F links in the rejection certificate.
